Discourse analysis of the technical document series that records the internet design history, the RFCs, shows that those involved during the first decade saw privacy as a multi-dimensional and interactive problem requiring use of a suite of solutions at the network, individual, and data levels that had to take into account the need to balance privacy against experimentation and innovation. Internet designers were sophisticated in their pragmatic thinking about privacy when evaluated vis-a-vis theoretical developments since that time, viewing privacy as a contextual matter involving boundary setting, and using information architecture and metadata as tools for privacy protection. Those in the social science and legal communities think about the privacy effects of communication on humans, while those in the technical design community must focus on privacy as a set of logistical problems. Bringing these diverse communities into a single conversation can considerably enrich and strengthen the work of all.
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document series that records the history of the design process -the Requests for Comments, or RFCs -deal with privacy, 1 the most frequently discussed social policy issue. Developments during the first decade of work -the 'framing years' (Braman, 2011) -were particularly influential because the initial decisions for what began as ARPANet 2 created the conditions under which 21st-century online threats to privacy became possible (Blumenthal and Clark, 2001; Denardis, 2009 ).
This article looks at the treatment of privacy issues in the RFCs from 1969 to 1979 using a discourse analysis that involved a comprehensive and inductive reading of the documents. Both features of this method were critical. Because about one third of the items identified through word search had only a spurious relationship to the subject as a policy issue and privacy issues were often discussed without using obvious terms, it was essential to read every line of every document. Because policy analysis of technical documents is a secondary reading requiring significant sociotechnical boundary work, the analysis had to be inductive and, often, conceptual, in order to elicit the privacy implications from descriptions of technical problems and their possible resolutions.
The RFCs are worth studying as a discourse because they are considered by insiders to be the 'documents of record' for the technical history of the internet (Leiner et al., 2010) . The series was launched by a few graduate students not long after they began working together to link the computers of their geographically distant sites. The goal was to share ideas and information within the quickly growing community. At launch, the series was insistently informal and welcomed all comers; over time, the publication process became formalized. Governance institutions such as the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) and the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) developed through the RFCs. Today, the texts are freely available online, hosted by the IETF at www.ietf.org.
This research is part of a larger project analyzing the treatment of legal and policy matters in the RFCs through 2009 (Braman, 2010) . 3 To fully grasp the origins of today's online privacy issues, however, a detailed understanding of the early thinking that shaped the network is necessary. Technical thinking of the era was so different from that of social scientists and legal scholars that these findings also include ideas about how to design privacy protection policies for technical environments, and specific protection techniques, that can valuably be added to the toolkit of today's policy makers. Legal approaches to protecting privacy fail when they are incomplete, and when they do not take into account the actual nature of the technologies involved; social scientists will see early foreshadowings of some ideas with great currency today, and encounter others that may stimulate new research and social theory.
Empirical research on and theorizing about privacy have become ever-more important scholarly enterprises. Because of space limitations, unfortunately there is room here only for a few outstanding exemplars from the literature. Privacy is inherently political (Branscomb, 1986; Star and Ruhleder, 1996) , involving the very boundary-defining activities (Petronio, 2002) that are so flexible and complex in the networking environment. The same user can have competing privacy interests (Case, 2000) ; determining which dominates in any given circumstance is a contextual exercise (Nissenbaum, 2004) . Privacy suffers from 'policy drift' because it lacks an organized constituency, and because practice tends to dominate over explicit decision making (Smith, 1994) . The economic costs of privacy invasions are difficult to quantify, though not long after the period reported upon here privacy protection became a marketable service (Auerbach, 1983) . Technological innovations introduce new vulnerabilities that are often difficult to foresee because they are unfamiliar or result from such complex interactions that they may be unknowable until they occur.
The internet design community addressed privacy issues at the network, the individual, and the data levels during [1969] [1970] [1971] [1972] [1973] [1974] [1975] [1976] [1977] [1978] [1979] . They understood that privacy is interdependent; effective protection requires successful use of the entire bundle of privacy protections across those three levels. They understood that privacy protections themselves can require privacy. Privacy conditions change, requiring renewed attention with every innovation or change in the system. Other ideas from the period can be, or already have been, brought into recent use by practitioners, if not by policy-makers or theorists.
The article begins by looking at privacy as a network design problem. It goes on to look at arguments for, and then against, privacy protection at each level before examining the techniques for protecting privacy discussed in the RFCs.
Privacy as a design problem
The internet is not the first communication technology to raise privacy concerns. During the 19th and early 20th centuries, what were experienced as invasions of privacy by reporters for print newspapers so angered people that violence against the press resulted ( Nerone, 1994) . The telephone, introduced in the 1880s, allowed individuals into the home who would not have been permitted to enter previously (Marvin, 1988) . Between 1930 and 1950, police take-up of the combination of cars and radios diminished citizen privacy (Dandeker, 1990) . Protecting the privacy of networked communications was a policy issue beginning with the telegraph; it was one of the first topics addressed in 1865 by the organization that became the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) (Codding, 1972) . Studies of computing in the 1950s and 1960s concluded that new technologies exacerbated privacy as a social problem (Kling, 1980) , and the issue was covered in a series of articles on the information society in the most prestigious economic newspaper in Japan in 1969 (Ito, 1991) .
The ubiquity and complexity of the internet make privacy a networked communication policy issue of central importance. During the period discussed here, governments around the world were thinking deeply about privacy issues and reviewing their own laws and practices. The internet is a 'network of networks' (RFC 1122) that was international in intention from the start and in reality by the mid-1970s (Braman, in press ). It was US law, though, that provided the legal context for ARPANet/internet designers of the 1970s; all but 5 of the 718 documents in the series published by the close of 1979 were authored by individuals employed by organizations headquartered in the USA.
Privacy concerns generated by new types of databases for census information and labor statistics led to a series of studies funded by private foundations as well as the government (US Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, 1973; Privacy Protection Study Commission, 1977; Westin and Baker, 1972) . All of these warned that privacy problems would become more serious when databases became networked. Books by Alan Westin (e.g. 1970) and by Arthur Miller (1971) popularized the issue. Other pertinent developments during the period included passage of the Privacy Act in 1974 and the introduction of principles for fair digital information practices (Regan, 2008; Trubow, 1989 ).
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Active contributors to the internet design process, such as the RAND Corporation that works so closely with the US government, had been working on digital privacy problems before becoming involved in building a working network (RFC 243) . The difference between reaching a consensus on privacy protection as a general principle and achieving agreement on actual techniques to be used immediately became evident, as did the need to balance privacy against maximizing the capacity for experimentation and innovation (RFC 195) . It was also recognized, however, that techniques developed to protect privacy could serve additional technical and social functions (RFC 269).
Privacy first appeared in the RFCs in a description of variations in practice (RFC 109). By 1972, the need for log-in privacy was so widely accepted that the use of passwords showed up without comment in an example of a protocol (RFC 307), though the same could not yet be said for masking such information (RFC 318). As a categorization system for protocols developed, privacy (RFC 750), and then security (RFC 753), were identified as running topics. The issue inevitably arose in discussions about access (RFC 487). Every site was asked to provide information pertinent to how it protected privacy at the points of log-in, protection of online activity, storage, and output in a survey intended to provide support to remote users (RFC 364). In 1978, the ability of sites to send mail to unknown users (RFC 751) -which can be experienced as invasions of privacy -was tested.
Throughout the decade, privacy-related concepts were further articulated (e.g. RFC 435), and additional vulnerabilities were described (e.g. RFC 666). Still, some felt that privacy was not receiving enough attention, constantly being postponed to be dealt with 'later' -even though there was evidence that privacy problems were far worse than was being generally acknowledged (RFC 602). Various privacy issues were conflated in a way many believed unuseful (RFC 501). A distinction between security and privacy was acknowledged but never clarified conceptually; for technical decision-makers, the logistical problems were the same. Arguments both for and against protecting privacy were in play.
Arguments for protecting privacy
Arguments for including privacy protections in internet design were presented from the perspectives of the network as a whole, of individual hosts, and of the user. Distinctions among the three levels were clear to network designers (see e.g. RFC 610).
Privacy at the network level
Four arguments for protecting privacy at the network level emerged during the first decade of the RFCs. There was appreciation of the critical role of privacy as essential to network integrity, an affordance for resource sharing through the network, a support for accounting systems, and an element of professionalization.
Protection of network integrity. The need to protect network integrity was so important that one strongly supported proposed protocol (RJE) was abandoned because of its weaknesses on this front (RFC 725). The general need to ensure network integrity (RFC 62) became unbundled into a number of distinct problems as the design effort progressed. The importance of trust, today widely recognized as key to success in any type of networked activity, was discussed by network designers as early as 1971 (RFC 98). Users of protected file systems, they pointed out, must be able to have confidence that servers can correctly identify remote users (RFC 114). Authors writing from a national security perspective employed the trickle-down argument: developing privacy protections to military specifications would result in enhanced privacy for all (RFC 316).
As has been the case throughout the internet design process, humans and 'daemon' (computing process) users were treated separately (Braman, 2011) . Although policy-makers and social scientists are not accustomed to applying the concept of privacy to non-humans, network designers felt that, at least under certain conditions, socket names deserved privacy (RFC 54) and that server processes needed to be able to securely exchange those names in order to establish a trusted connection (RFC 430). It was unclear which identifier for a computing process should be used when determining access rights (RFC 501), or how a server should determine whether or not any given process required a distinct log-in process for identity verification (RFC 555).
Enabling resource sharing. Two types of resource sharing were discussed during the first decade of the internet design process -computational resources and data. We tend to think of sharing as a human activity, but for internet designers of the 1970s resource sharing was a form of 'interprocess' communication linking specific resources to particular processes (RFC 61). However, it was also understood that privacy for human users was essential to what was, at the time, referred to as 'indirect' use of networked computers (RFC 114) -computing involving two or more machines and/or undertaken at a distance.
Privacy was one of six broad areas identified as crucial for data sharing in 1971 (RFC 146), equal in importance to manipulating files across systems, logically restructuring data in response to queries, standardizing data management across computers, and keeping duplicate copies of a database consistent. As reliance upon networked databases grew, so did the sense of urgency regarding the need to protect privacy (RFC 340), even though some users continued to prefer private connections for batch processing (RFC 647).
Accounting. As soon as ARPA-funded host sites opened themselves up to users without US government support, the question of who was doing what became a pressing accounting problem. Authentication of user identities was necessary for billing purposes, if for nothing else (RFC 136); without it, the cost of providing services would become system overhead at a level unsustainable for serving hosts (RFC 487). Passwords were an obvious means of requiring user identification and authenticating that information for accounting purposes (e.g. RFC 532).
Accounting-type arguments were applied in situations that did not actually involve financial transactions, such as the use of no-cost email systems (RFC 491). Indeed, once accounting entered the conversation, it took over. Some participants found it necessary to point out that this was not the only reason to require user identification (RFC 555).
Professionalism. During the first decade of the internet RFCs, professionalism entered the privacy conversation as a norm and as a practice. Many professions require keeping information confidential, and doing so is a mark of professionalism even when confidentiality is not absolutely required. Computing facilities often required assurances that the network 6 new media & society 0(0) enabled confidential sharing of information as a prerequisite to joining the network (RFC 111). Then, as now, there were suggestions that those who did data entry should be licensed in order to be able to hold them accountable for integrity and accuracy. The practice of keeping comments about specific individuals anonymous and the identity of those being discussed confidential was modeled in the RFCs when an author refrained from naming a particular site being discussed as an example of striking unreliability (RFC 282).
Privacy at the host level
During the 1970s there were so few computers that many RFC authors identified themselves with the names of their hosts rather than with their employing institutions' names. It is not surprising, then, that there was explicit discussion of protecting host integrity and verifying the identity of users of specific hosts.
The privacy of hosts was considered essential to their integrity and reputation, the privacy of the data and content they handled, and the confidentiality of those using the servers for experimentation. Hosts differed, however, in the level of attention given to privacy and the techniques used (RFC 109). To protect all content and the computer system as a whole, specific content had to be protected. Permitting even one inauthentic user to access files would place all of a system's files and data at risk (RFC 49).
The idea that serving hosts should require users to identify themselves through usernames and passwords, at minimum, appeared early in the decade and remained a constant. Hosts varied in the level of and types of details collected, depending on what it was that was being protected (RFC 163). In some cases, access controls were needed at the file level; in others, they were also needed at the level of data within a file (RFC 164); and for yet others -the military -there was additional verification before a terminal could be accessed to even get onto the network (RFC 316). Accessing and modifying data were distinguished (RFC 269), with separate provision of passwords sometimes required (RFC 463). The introduction of satellite linkages, which entailed long time delays during the 1970s, created an additional user verification problem (RFC 357).
Passwords and account information were seen as sensitive information also deserving of privacy (RFC 385). Authenticating the identity of the sender of a message or request was necessary for confidence that the sender was actually the user it claimed to be. The level of trust in any verification mechanism, in turn, depended upon the level of confidence in the source host overall (RFC 644).
Distinctions among types of users were also important for privacy purposes. Sponsors and users of data were treated differently (RFC 144), as were those putting data in and those taking it out (RFC 360). Identification was not always needed at the individual level; additional options included granting access to members of an identifiable group, everyone who has already been granted log-on privileges to a certain computer, and the public at large (RFC 487). Most systems allowed users to choose their own passwords, but at least one institution assigned user id-password pairs during the 1970s (RFC 436).
Privacy at the user level
User privacy preference was its own justification for incorporating protections into the network (RFC 90). That preference derived from concerns about who has access to, and Braman 7 who can manipulate, content; threats to data integrity (RFC 98); and the need to protect the quality of data representations as well as what we now refer to as metadata and information architecture (RFC 327). The intensity and nature of user privacy preference varied with the type of data involved (e.g. medical, criminal justice, or transactional) (RFC 144). It was important to protect particular files from unauthorized or accidental use (RFC 114). There were national security concerns about protecting data (RFC 90), files (RFC 316), and voice (RFC 741). Social security numbers were one example of a type of non-password information for which individual users would be keenly interested in privacy protection (RFC 731).
Users cared not only about the privacy of stored material, but also about protecting material in transit, whether files (RFC 354) or communications between human or daemon users (RFC 524). Protections were most often conceived of as access control mechanisms, keeping entities from content to which they did not have rights. As was noted in RFC 49, though, techniques for protecting privacy were also a means of ensuring access to rightful users; malicious users could make it impossible for others to get in.
Three drivers of user preference for privacy protections were particularly human in nature. First, there was a desire to protect secrets (RFC 318). Second, reflecting constitutional protections for anonymous speech under US law, there was also respect for the secrecy of authorship (e.g. RFC 282). It was expected that there would be anonymous users (e.g. RFC 450), and RFC 549 was authored anonymously. Third, the politics of the period fed privacy interests of RFC authors, as when one declared, 'I'm afraid that I can't work up much excitement about helping the CIA keep track of what anti-war demonstrations I attended in 1968 . . . .' (RFC 686: 1).
Arguments against protecting privacy
A number of reasons for not designing privacy protections into the network were also presented during the first decade of the design discussion. There were arguments based on utopian and/or political perspectives as well as those that derived from placing system efficiency at the top of the hierarchy of values being pursued. Vulnerabilities introduced by privacy protections are not arguments against privacy per se, but they might be used as such in some circumstances.
Utopian/political arguments
Though larger claims about the utopianism of network designers in their early years have been made (see e.g. Turner, 2006) , the relatively small and intimate nature of the design community certainly facilitated initial trust among group members. Some believed there was no need to protect privacy because all processes launched by system users would be 'good' (RFC 62: 3), and/or it was sufficient to rely upon the protections provided by serving hosts (RFC 114).
A second type of utopian argument emphasized the importance of free access. Email was offered as an example of both a network process (RFC 475) and of content (email that had been 'journalized' by the Network Information Center [NIC]) (e.g. RFC 629) that should be available to all anonymously (RFC 694). 
Efficiency arguments
All policy-making involves trade-offs in the promotion of multiple values of social importance. There were network designers during the 1970s who opposed the use of privacy protections because they would impede system efficiency (RFC 172). Such individuals wanted to ensure that daemon users could move fluidly (RFC 61) and that human users would have easy access to publicly available files (RFC 487).
Privacy protections did introduce constraints that made the design job more complicated. Jon Postel actually argued that the goal of finding a way to mask input in order to protect privacy should be dropped because it was too difficult -it was impossible to know just how much input to mask because passwords and other secure information were of variable length (RFC 328). In response, it was pointed out that just because a task was hard did not mean it could not -or should not -be done (RFC 340). In a multiple-document conversation, a consensus was ultimately reached on a still-familiar tactic: systems could specify either the exact number, or minima and maxima, of characters to be used in usernames, passwords, file names, and directory pathnames (RFC 607).
For users, the efficiency of data sharing was reduced by encryption, since keys were shared by a pair of communicating individuals only, although arrangements could be made to share keys among members of a group (RFC 753). A 1971 study showed that users found passwords easy to use (RFC 269), although some (presciently) believed that in the long run users would get tired of having to type in usernames and passwords all the time (RFC 491).
Vulnerability arguments
Internet designers quickly learned that privacy protections could themselves introduce vulnerabilities to both privacy and protocols. These weaknesses could be either human or technical. At the intersection of the two were those matters that began as human errors but were addressed with software solutions.
There was evidence that such vulnerabilities did allow the network to be hacked. In 1973, at least two major serving hosts crashed under suspicious circumstances; at the least, the individuals involved should have known what they were risking. On a third system, the method of establishing passwords was compromised by two high school students (RFC 602). Since experimentation with hacking -'phreaking' -of the telephone network had begun in 1957 when automatic switches were introduced, there was an active subculture ready to work on breaking into the new packet switching network.
Human failures.
A number of types of what we now popularly refer to as 'operator errors' that defeat or undermine privacy protection efforts were mentioned in RFCs from 1969 through 1979. Some of these are familiar today; others, dependent upon long-gone administrative procedures, are less so.
Individual sites with a history of physical isolation did not immediately recognize that new procedures were necessary in a networked environment. People commonly used passwords that were easy to guess. And users were frustrated when a host randomly changed the free access passwords without alerting them (RFC 369). The telephone numbers of host sites were published far more widely than intended, or than most understood; one author likened their distribution to that of phone numbers on walls of men's rooms Braman 9 (RFC 602). Inconsistent use of names, nicknames, and initials in addressing was problematic (RFC 757). The NIC maintained a list of all of those on the network, but the list was inaccurate, left out nicknames in common usage, and was designed in such a way that it was difficult to computerize (RFC 752). Differences in editing systems from one computer to another were hard on users (RFC 475).
Some mistakes were amusing. One RFC reported that a particular ARPANet host was so suspicious of those not at the local site that it randomly generated a new password every week for remote users -and then distributed that password through unprotected email. Those who received the information typically copied it to an unprotected file on their hard drives, so not one but two vulnerabilities were introduced by this purported effort to protect privacy (RFC 686).
Technical failures. The state of network design during the 1970s left technical openings for several types of invasions of privacy. A number of computers did not 'respect,' or make use of, network IDs generated by the NIC for verification (RFC 475). Users could deliberately game the system. There were several techniques an individual without privileges could use to gain access to protected files (RFC 505), including simply having them mailed through the network (RFC 487).
Complex interactions among diverse network elements also created vulnerabilities. A system for testing changes to system fundamentals such as the computer core and code for network connections did not initially include a means of analyzing unauthorized activity. It was soon recognized that this would be necessary to protect against what were already being referred to as hackers, though it was also acknowledged that identifying unauthorized activity would not in itself be sufficient to protect against 'a determined and malicious attack' (RFC 521: 2). The name/finger program, which allowed remote users to see a 'friendly, human-oriented status report' about who was using a given host, provided so much information that many experienced its use as a privacy invasion (RFC 752).
Failures at the human/daemon intersection. Two privacy problems that arose during [1969] [1970] [1971] [1972] [1973] [1974] [1975] [1976] [1977] [1978] [1979] were initially perceived to derive from human error but were addressed through programming and then treated as a technical matter. Both involved keeping databases current when data within them changes. It was decided that simultaneous alterations to indexes were required to keep them accurate when there are changes in the data (RFC 219), and obsolete information had to be removed from databases (RFC 677).
Privacy protection techniques
By 1971 it was clear that privacy could be addressed in multiple ways, ranging from restricting knowledge of the pathname to a particular file, to password protection for directories, to an elaborate hierarchy of group-project-task-username membership with separate controls for reading and writing (RFC 180). The phrase 'access controls' had come into use to refer to the practice of defining user-specific access privileges (RFC 354). Such controls included specifying whether more than one user could simultaneously work on a file; whether a file creator can specify authorized users and, if so, how; and whether it was possible to put in place different access controls for different subunits of a file (RFC 354)
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The myriad techniques for privacy protection that were proposed and/or underwent experimentation during the period 1969-1979 can be categorized according to whether they were to be applied to humans, network processes, or data. There was extensive discussion in the RFCs during the first decade regarding just where responsibility for protecting privacy should lie and the need to disperse techniques throughout the infrastructure, but there is insufficient space here to cover these matters.
Human techniques
Identifying users at the point of logging in received the most attention as a human means of protecting privacy, but other approaches mentioned included making agreements offline and masking input. Many systems set up for local users of a site, where informal procedures previously sufficed because all users had personal knowledge of those who had access, did not work or were not available for remote users (RFC 364); privacy can be an intraorganizational issue that becomes a public matter once an organization is networked.
Logging in. Several still-familiar options were described with the first mention of passwords: allowing everyone on, requiring a recognized identifier (which could be a username), requiring a password, or requiring both an id and a password. Specifications for the log-in dialog included both what to say and how to say it (RFC 98). It was not long before account numbers were added to the options (RFC 223). During the early years, the password would actually not be accepted until the receiving system knew that it had sufficient space to accommodate another user (RFC 122). Many systems that permitted anyone to become a user, at least to learn what capabilities were offered by the host, still required log-on but provided a common identifier for all (RFC 265). Initially it was believed that systems did not need to acknowledge receipt of log-in information (RFC 265), but reply codes soon came into use to report on the success or failure of the communication and/or the connection itself (RFC 640).
With time, log-in processes became more elaborate. The log-in detail included in the File Transfer Protocol (FTP) included attention to such matters as flushing identifier information from the system after use and masking the input (RFC 542). It became clear that servers needed to verify identifier information provided by users; at the time, the NIC, an entity internal to the ARPA-funded team, handled this function (RFC 555), but many argued for third party service instead (e.g. RFC 462). Some hosts required separate identifiers for specific tasks once on a system (RFC 360), or insisted that a given set of log-in identifiers could only be used by one user at a time (RFC 477).
Though many of the ideas from the 1970s about how to handle log-in practices are still in use, others came and went. The counterintuitive practice of submitting user identifier information at any point during a session rather than at the beginning was permitted for a while (RFC 265), but soon disappeared. One author proposed the concept of a network 'birthplace', the site from which a user first comes onto the network, as a unique lifelong network ID (RFC 757).
Masking input. The echoplex function, first used for logging in, sends typed material directly to the computer; the computer then echoes that material back to a printer (RFC 98) or screen. It was quickly realized that passwords should not be readable if they are to provide privacy protection, so the 'hide your input' command directed printing to be suppressed (RFC 158). Ultimately the echoplex and hide your input functions were distinguished, with the latter a special case of the former (RFC 393). Because not all hosts during the 1970s could support the echo and mask input functions (RFC 393), one proposal for a directory service recommended including information about whether each host expected a terminal to echo locally or remotely (RFC 608).
Limits were put on the length of passwords in order to support input masking; the initial recommendation was that passwords should be limited to 8 characters, and usernames to 32 (RFC 614). The dysfunctionality of masking all mail content was an argument against sending network mail directly to printers (RFC 475).
Offline arrangements. One of the earliest privacy protection techniques discussed in the RFCs was establishing a connection only after both parties previously agreed to do so by telephone or letter. This was thought to be a good means of ensuring that 'both users [are] confident that they are talking [with] each other, and not some interloper' (RFC 129: 2). The authors of this 1971 document were leery of using a directory to verify identity because they believed that such an approach would make computers more vulnerable to attack.
Network-based techniques
The fascinating question of what internet designers thought about the law-like properties of the technical standards they were developing is beyond the scope of this article, but it is interesting to note that one of the first expressions of the sense that the network protocols should be treated as essentially legal in function appeared in a discussion of the problem of user identification: it should be a basic protocol law that no process whatsoever may request or accept connections or transmit or receive data over a socket having a user code not its own. (RFC 49: 4, emphasis in the original) Four approaches to protecting privacy at the network level developed during the 1970s: private networks, termination of activity, message design, and connection identities.
Private networking. Although the goal was to build a network for widespread use, it was understood from the start that -at least for some purposes, and for some users -there are times when it is desirable to cordon off networking activity. This would create a subset that would connect with the larger network but be separated from it (RFC 54). The word 'intranet' first came into use to refer to private networking in 1979 (RFC 753).
Off-line storage, with disk packs owned by users rather than by the provider of computing services, was another early privacy protection technique at the network level (RFC 90). Documentation about the network that needed to be kept private (whether for national security or intellectual property rights reasons) was sent only to those who should receive it via individually addressed memos rather than being distributed to all by NIC (RFC 82).
Termination of activity.
Terminating activity came into use to protect the privacy of processes and content. As soon as an error message was received, a host would shut down all processes new media & society 0(0) to protect local data and remote user privacy (RFC 98). Additional triggers for terminating activity to protect privacy protection were identified over time, including failure to complete the username and password within a specified time period (RFC 360). In a variation on the theme that did not survive, one facility experimented with closing the connection used for log-in purposes and opening a second for transmission (RFC 310) .
The reinitialize command in FTP terminated a user, flushing all input, output, and account information (RFC 454). Because this not only cleared buffers but also provided some privacy protection, some hosts began to flush user information from their systems once all jobs had been completed (RFC 477). Harvard even deleted all files associated with a terminal that was no longer active (RFC 499).
Message design. Two features of message design had privacy functions. Content was packetized, and headers were structured.
Traditional wired telecommunication networks used line switching, in which two pieces of equipment are linked by a line moved from one connection to another manually (using a switchboard) or electronically (automated switching). With packet switching -central to the concept of the internet (e.g. RFC 675) -messages are broken into many packets, each with its own header and path to the receiver, and the whole is reassembled upon receipt. Packetizing protects content privacy during transmission when only some fragments of a message are intercepted.
There were several ways in which 1970s ideas about message headers protected privacy. Inclusion of an 'authentication' field provided information about which originator fields had been authenticated, and by which systems. The 'BCC' (blind carbon copy) field was believed useful for access control (RFC 680). A header could tell users whether or not the connection was secure (RFC 717). An 'FCC' (folder carbon copy) header field was discussed to tell users where messages were being stored (RFC 724) .
Header design provides a good example of unintended consequences for privacy from decisions made for other purposes. Because in the 1970s secretaries commonly sent mail on behalf of their employers, headers distinguished between 'sender' (the message originator) and 'from' (the message author) (RFC 680). By default the two fields were the same, but the sender field was editable -creating opportunities for spoofing down the road.
The header discussion distinguished between providing information to human and daemon users. As the author of the initial proposal to include authentication information in the header confessed, 'This document attempts to tread the narrow line between features for human processing and features for machine processing' (RFC 680: 1). The fields listed were meant to be useful to humans even if automatic processing were not supplied; instructions within angle brackets were intended to provide machine-readable information when a daemon should look at a field. The general bias toward designing for daemons rather than humans (Braman, 2011) played out here as well; it was quickly found necessary to issue a reminder to make sure that mail headers -including fields related to privacy and security -were readable by humans (RFC 724).
Connection identity.
Another opening for daemon rather than human privacy issues was created when, during the first year of the design process, each computer on the network was given a unique socket identifier so that connections could be named by the pair of sockets linked (RFC 54). These identification numbers provided some assurance regarding the identity of the user (RFC 61), and it was possible to set it up so that a socket could connect with only one process (RFC 675). Users could specify that connections would be accepted only from specific hosts and sockets (RFC 438). This proved insufficient; within the decade, there were calls for the sending of specific messages if a security or privacy issue were suspected at the point of connection (RFC 686), and authentication issues began to receive more attention (RFC 739).
Data-based techniques
Encryption is a well-known privacy protection technique that works with the information being protected rather than the network or the user. Structuring and labeling data can serve privacy functions.
Encryption. Encryption was first mentioned as a complement to metadata for privacy purposes (RFC 610). The military desire to use the network for voice communications stimulated the interest in encryption (RFC 720). An extensive scheme included in the 'Internet Message Protocol' (IMP) in 1979 made it possible to encrypt messages as a whole or in part, and all parts of a message -including header information -could be protected (RFC 753).
Information architecture. Discussion of the use of pathnames to enable file-specific access controls began in 1971 (RFC 114). The privacy and security value of such information was considered so important that access controls for file directories themselves were suggested (RFC 219). The introduction of 'data languages' that stored information about data separately from the data made it possible to orient access controls around this metadata rather than requiring user specification of controls as each file was created (RFC 219).
Conclusions
Those involved in designing the internet, 1969-1979, thought about privacy in ways that expand upon the conceptualizations available in the social science and legal literatures then and now. Some of the ideas introduced by the computer scientists and electrical engineers foreshadowed notions introduced much later in the social sciences or the law, while others have not yet seen their parallels in other intellectual communities. The reverse is also true: not all of the legal and social scientific approaches to conceptualizing privacy and responses available during the decade studied made their way into the RFC discourse. Those in the social science and legal communities thought and think about the consequences of the loss of privacy on individuals and, occasionally, on the functioning of groups or communities; those in the technical design community appreciate the importance of those consequences, but focus their thinking on privacy as a set of logistical problems effectively intertwined with security issues. This lack of congruity presents an opportunity for today's policy makers, who can use what can be learned from this technical discourse to add to their privacy toolkit. It also highlights the value of the effort to bring technical, social science, and legal thinkers into a shared discursive community in pursuit of common goals. The areas in which the two very different approaches to privacy yield similar insights, such as the importance of privacy as a boundary-setting mechanism, identify subjects of particular value for future research as well as practice.
Those involved in design of the internet during the first decade of the process saw privacy as a multi-dimensional and interactive problem requiring successful use of each element of a suite of solutions at the network, individual, and data levels. They acted on their awareness that privacy has to be revisited every time there is a change in technologies. They understood that the same user may hold conflicting views on privacy, depending on which activity is being undertaken and the role held. They knew that the introduction of one technique for protecting privacy could open up other possible means of invading privacy -and that privacy begets the need for yet more privacy.
Network designers during the 1970s appear extremely sophisticated in their thinking about privacy when evaluated vis-a-vis theoretical developments since that time. They viewed privacy as contextual and understood that it involves boundary setting. They were cleareyed regarding tensions between privacy and other goals such as efficiency. Information architecture and metadata were used by these electrical engineers and computer scientists as tools for privacy protection.
Future work will continue to trace the development of thinking about and techniques for protecting privacy on the internet as it evolved. For now, policy makers can take away the message that general statements about protecting data privacy are inadequate. To protect privacy in the digital network environment, legal and regulatory mandates must be more specific in detailing the various sites and processes at which or during which privacy must be protected. No single technique can be effective if an entire bundle of practices affecting users, technologies, software, and the system itself are not all actively in play. For mandates regarding privacy protection techniques to make sense, law makers should be working together with those in the technical community rather than in isolation or in opposition.
Notes
1. The final document in 1979 is RFC 758, but a number of the documents from this period are not publicly available because of intellectual property rights concerns, or because they were never digitized, or because they were lost. 2. The network was initially referred to as ARPANet because the first financial support came from the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) of the US Department of Defense. The name 'internet' came into use with the take-up of the TCP protocol developed under contract to ARPA in 1974 (RFC 675). 3. For an overview of the larger project, see Braman (2010 
